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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the eﬀects of tax structures (levels, progressivity, dual earning households)
on female employment and, consequently, the rising service sector. US regional variation
shows that the size of the service economy and female employment are positively correlated,
and partially determined by diﬀerent tax regimes. The paper uses a multi-sector model to:
(1) quantify the eﬀect of diﬀerent tax regimes in incentivizing woman to enter the labor
force, and (2) estimate the feedback eﬀect from women entering the labor force on the service
sector size. Counterfactual results suggest that: (1) European-style taxes decrease female
employment growth by 48 percent and the rise of the service sector by 13 percent, with tax
progressivity having a stronger eﬀect than levels; and (2) working women and changing family
structures account for 22 percent of the relative rise in US service employment; European taxes
depress relative service hours an additional 11 percent.
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1 Introduction
This paper estimates the eﬀects of tax structures (levels, progressivity, dual earning house-
holds) on female employment and, consequently, the process of structural transformation (the
rising service sector). Countries that have large service sectors also tend to have more fe-
male employment and a lower gender wage gap. However, more progressive or higher level
tax structures have a dampening eﬀect on secondary workers, usually women, and therefore,
potentially the size of the service sector.
OECD countries show a correlation between aggregate service employment and relative
female employment time trends of around 0.82 from the 1980s onwards (Rogerson, 2005).
The causality likely goes both ways. That is, (1) a larger service sector provides women
with better employment opportunities, both in terms of wages and job openings, and (2)
a larger female labor force demands more market produced services (e.g., childcare, elderly
care, prepared meals) resulting in a larger service sector. However, many countries’ tax codes
connect household employment choices and the consumption of market produced services (e.g.,
childcare, restaurant meals) through policies (e.g., marriage penalties, childcare subsidies).
Therefore, given the policy debate on how to increase women’s employment rates (e.g., in
Japan, Korea and Switzerland, OECD, 2015a), I am motivated to study the combination of
tax codes and sectoral change in a quantitative framework.
Using US state-level data, I document three facts concerning the service sector, female
employment and taxes:
1. States with larger service sectors have more female employment.
2. The rise in service employment and female employment is positively correlated.
3. However, increases in average income tax rates dampen female employment.
Given these facts, I build a multi-sector model with taxes, structural change, and demographic
changes to address two research questions: (1) how large are the hypothetical costs (gains)
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of introducing European-style tax regimes for the US economy, and (2) how important is the
feedback eﬀect from women entering the labor force on the service sector size.
The model is based on a standard general equilibrium multi-sector model (e.g., see Ngai
and Pissarides, 2008) augmented with an island structure. Islands are useful in modeling
diﬀerences across regions (service- versus manufacturing-intensive). The share of households
in each island evolves with structural transformation. Households are heterogeneous in family
size (married or single, with none or two children) and educational attainment (high school,
some college, college, and post-graduate). Households allocate time between the home and
labor market, and choose consumption over three types of goods: market produced services,
market produced goods and home-produced services.
There are three key assumptions. (1) Men are assumed to have equal productivity across
all sectors, while women’s average productivity in each sector is taken from wage data. (2) It is
harder (more costly) to find a service sector job on the industrial island - women draw sector-
specific disutilities preferring service jobs. (3) Households can produce a substitute for market
produced services (e.g., childcare, elderly care, meals) using goods and time. Combining these
three assumptions incentivize women to enter the labor market as the service sector grows -
substituting home hours with household appliances and market services.
The calibration matches a number of 1977 US data targets.1 To provide quantitative
results addressing the two research questions above, I simulate the calibrated model with
tax data, household structures (marital status, children, educational attainment) and relative
wages from the late 1970s and 2000s.2 The baseline model accounts for three-quarters of the
rise in both female hours and the rise in relative service hours in the US.
Using the benchmark simulation, the eﬀect of higher taxes can be analyzed. More specif-
ically, the calibrated model allows the two broad research questions above to be explicitly
stated as:
1Moro, Moslehi and Tanaka (2015) show that the growth rate of the market service share only took-oﬀ
after 1978, while the share of home production only started falling after 1978.
2To avoid capturing policies related strictly to the financial crisis, the exercise is conducted with tax data
up to 2007. However, the results are not sensitive to using later tax information.
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1a. How much would (female) employment have grown in the US with German-style taxes?
1b. Do tax levels or progressivity matter more?
2a. How important is increased female labor force participation for the expansion of the
service sector?
2b. What are the eﬀects of taxes?
Various counterfactuals address these questions. The first experiment indicates that a hypo-
thetical US economy with German taxes can account for a large drop in hours worked for
both men and women. The second experiment, where progressivity is set to zero and tax
levels are re-calibrating to match average household tax bills from the first counterfactual,
shows that married couples gain from eliminating progressivity, but single women, who are
poorer in relative terms, are hurt by a switch in tax regimes. As married women work slightly
more, the relative fall in industry-to-service hours contracts by 5 percent less in this second
experiment. Lastly, with US taxes, the income and substitution eﬀect of female employment
on the service sector size can account for roughly 11 percent of the rise in relative service
sector employment. These eﬀects are mainly generated by married couples decreasing home
working hours. Changes in family structure alone over the time period account for 9 percent
of a change in relative service hours. Combining income/substitution eﬀects and changes in
family structure account for up-to 22 percent in the benchmark. With a German tax schedule,
these changes lead to an additional 10 percent fall in service-to-industry hours.
The importance of taxes and structural transformation has been highlighted in cross-
country studies of aggregate hours worked. Not only taxes (Prescott, 2004), but a combination
of taxes and structural change are important in explaining cross-country diﬀerences (Rogerson,
2008). Subsequent research points to a lack of the marketization of services, a term coined
by Freeman and Schettkat (2005), as a cause for low aggregate hours worked. Ragan (2013)
and Olovsson (2009) show that higher European tax rates motivate individuals to shift hours
4
from the market to the home (or leisure), in contrast to the low tax rates found in the US.
Duernecker and Herrendorf (2014) show that cross-country diﬀerences stem from a rise in
leisure time, not home production, at least for the comparison of France and the US. All this
literature models the household as a single representative agent facing diﬀerent tax levels,
while McDaniel (2010) finds that market work and home production vary to a large extent
when disaggregated by sex. Olivetti and Petrongolo (2011) further show that countries with
smaller service sectors have less female employment. These latter results suggest a need to
explicitly model women and to assess the impact of women on structural change.
In adding a two-person household, the model features labor force participation both at the
intensive and extensive margin similar to Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura (2013). The authors
study the possible aggregate eﬀect of adopting a European-style childcare subsidy scheme in
the US. To their base model I add (1) multiple sectors to incorporate the eﬀects of structural
transformation, and (2) leisure. As Duernecker and Herrendorf (2014) point out, leisure is
a decision not usually modeled, but important for understanding cross-country diﬀerences
related to structural change and market hours. The modeling of tax schedules is based on
Holter, Krueger and Stepanchuk (2014) who use a similar joint-decision problem to study the
eﬀects of taxes on government revenue.
While this is the first paper to combine taxes, female employment and structural transfor-
mation in a single model, there are a number of studies that have analyzed a subset of these
three topics. Buera, Kaboski and Zhao (2013) is most similar in spirit to this paper. Omit-
ting taxes and women’s higher productivity in services, the authors build on the framework
of Buera and Kaboski (2012) to study the role of skill, scale and women in the rise of services.
The authors find only a very small feedback eﬀect from female employment on services. How-
ever, they suggest that the model’s inability to match the rise in married women’s hours may
be the driving force. This missing link, in turn, is likely due to omitting women’s sectoral
productivity diﬀerences and preferences. Ngai and Petrongolo (2015) focus on the long run
trends in the US and changes in structural transformation, but omit tax issues. Their aim is
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determining how much of the closing gender wage and employment gaps can be explained by
structural change. However, I find that the gender pay gap closes similarly for both sectors,
which may explain why structural change alone cannot completely explain the closing wage
gap in previous studies. As generating a rise in female hours is a necessary condition for esti-
mating the feedback of women’s employment on service employment, I introduce the closing
wage gap exogenously. Also omitting taxes, Akbulut (2011) focuses on explaining the rise in
female employment through structural change. Omitting the structural transformation as-
pect, Bick and Fuchs-Schuendeln (2012) and Chakraborty, Holter and Stepanchuk (2015) use
diﬀerences in taxation to explain diﬀerences in female employment over a large cross-section
of countries. Both papers find taxes play a substantial role in explaining cross-country diﬀer-
ences in hours worked. Given the findings of all these seperate studies, there is substantial
value, especially for policy analysis, to analyzing the eﬀects of combining all three elements:
female labor market choices, structural transformation and taxes.
2 Empirical Trends
I exploit variation across US metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) and states in the Current
Population Survey (CPS), combined with NBER tax data (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993), to
show how taxes, the service sector and households’ employment decisions are interrelated.
Given the availability of NBER state-level tax data starting in the late-1970s, the analysis
focuses on the late-1970s (mostly 1977/1979 onward) until 2010.
For long-run changes over time, data from 1977 to 2010 is averaged by decade. I compute
average hours worked per year by gender, as well as relative hours worked in the service (versus
industrial) sector by MSAs and states. By definition an MSA combines urban agglomerations
linked by employment or other commerce. If the wife is the secondary earner, which was
especially true in the 1970s, her employment opportunities are best described by this local
industry. I find that wives that live in MSAs with a smaller service sector are also less likely
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Figure 1: Service-Employment Correlation
to work (see Figure 1). There is some variation across years, with the population weighted
correlation between average service hours and average female market hours decreasing from
0:430 in the 1970s to 0:246 by 2010. For husbands there is no equivalent relationship in hours
and service sector size.
Figure 2 graphs changes in average hours worked across the 1970 and 2000 decades for
men and women. The raw correlation between the rise of relative service hours and female
market hours is 0:588 compared to 0:003 for men. Areas with the largest increase in female
hours also saw the largest increase in relative service hours.3
Given variation in state income tax laws over time, it is possible to control for changes
in average tax rates. I use average tax rates from the US Taxsim Calculator from 1979 to
2010 for a fixed sample of taxpayers in 1984 across all states to only capture changes in tax
laws.4 Table 1 shows that accounting for tax changes and a number of other cross-state
diﬀerences (e.g., changes in family size, family composition etc.) increases the R-squared to
0:549 using state-level data. While every additional 1 percentage point increase in relative
service hours increases female hours by close to half a percentage point (0:453), every addi-
3There are considerable fewer MSAs in the 1970s CPS survey then in the 2000s, however, when aggregating
the results on the state level instead, the correlations for women is comparable at 0:553.
4For further details on the tax data used in this section see www.nber.org/taxsim.
7
4
6
8
10
12
14
2 4 6 8 10
Rise in Average Service Hours (%)
Linear Fit 1970s to 2000s
R
is
e 
in
 A
ve
ra
ge
 F
em
al
e 
Ho
ur
s 
(%
)
Population Weighted Correlation = 0.5877
(a) Women
−
4
−
2
0
2
4
2 4 6 8 10
Rise in Average Service Hours (%)
Linear Fit 1970s to 2000s
R
is
e 
in
 A
ve
ra
ge
 M
al
e 
Ho
ur
s 
(%
)
Population Weighted Correlation = 0.0030
(b) Men
Source: CPS. MSA observations are weighted by population averaged over the two decades.
Figure 2: Service-Employment Change
tional 1 percentage point increase in average state tax rates decreases female hours by just
over one-quarter of a percentage point ( 0:268). For men the equivalent regression has an
R-squared of 0:269 and the coeﬃcient on tax rates, while negative, is statistically insignificant.
These correlations are highly robust under a number of specifications. The positive sign on
the share of married individuals is explained by the addition of children. That is, the last
three coeﬃcients together capture the overall picture of changes in household composition.
When dropping changes in children, the coeﬃcient on marriage rates turns negative. A state
with an increasing share of single household has a larger increase in female hours worked. In
addition to providing state-level results, Table 1 also provides the results using MSAs. Since
individuals are taxed in their state of residence and MSAs can span various states, changes in
tax rates are averaged by population weights from each state. On the MSA-level the eﬀect of
taxes is even stronger for women. The eﬀect of a 1 percentage point increase in service hours
is still around half a percent. A 1 percentage point increase in taxes now exactly oﬀsets the
gain from a rise in relative service hours. However, in magnitudes, tax increases have been
considerably smaller than increases in service employment during this time. Again there is
no statistically significant eﬀect for men, not even for changes in service employment.
There could be many potential reasons why women predominately work in the service
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Table 1: Employment Changes
States MSAs
Hf Hm Hf Hm
Hs 0.453** 0.335*** 0.514*** -0.104
(0.186) (0.118) (0.108) (0.088)
 Avg. Tax Burden -0.268* -0.300 -0.540* -0.104
(0.160) (0.255) (0.285) (0.334)
 Spouse’s Hours -0.159 -0.132 0.423** 0.401***
(0.154) (0.149) (0.175) (0.142)
 Married 0.223 0.297*** -0.125 0.173*
(0.156) (0.098) (0.082) (0.099)
# Children -0.105*** -0.042* -0.086*** 0.034
(0.027) (0.024) (0.022) (0.025)
 Fraction Child under 5 -0.101 0.082 -0.202** 0.358***
(0.144) (0.141) (0.085) (0.082)
Observations 51 51 45 45
R-squared 0.549 0.269 0.712 0.555
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results are weighted by population averaged over time.
sector. I focus on two key assumptions in the model: (1) women are relatively more productive
(earn higher wages in the service sector); and (2) women have a utility preference for working
in oﬃce- rather than factory-jobs. These two assumptions are motivated by prior research and
wage gap estimates from the CPS. Figure 3 graphs the natural logarithm of male-to-female US
weekly median wages by sector of individuals working at least 1,400 hours per year. The left
panel shows the gender pay gap for both the industry and service sectors, while the right panel
shows the same gender pay gap corrected for selection bias using the Heckman correction. The
wage gap in services is consistently smaller even when correcting for selection. On average,
controlling for selection can account for 20 percent of the diﬀerence between the two sectors’
gender pay gaps (and a large share of the overall gender pay gap in the 1980s). Broken down
over time, in the late-1970s/early-1980s selection can account for up to 60 percent of the pay
gap diﬀerence between sectors. By the late-2000s, selection accounts for less than five percent,
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Figure 3: Gender Wag Gap
suggesting that both productivity and taste diﬀerences must play a role in women’s sectoral
labor market choices. Rendall (2010) provides one potential explanation for this persistent
gap by observing that industry occupations usually require more brawn than brain, with
women having a comparative advantage in brain. Moreover, Goldin (1990) observes that as
far back as the 1920s/1930s, women made work choices based on the level of brawn required,
which usually meant women preferred service sector jobs. She argues that “clerical work was
cleaner and less strenuous than manufacturing work . . . .”
3 General Equilibrium Model
Given the empirical facts, the economy consists of two islands, a service-intensive island and
a manufacturing-intensive island. Individulas are “born” on either island and remain there for
their lifetime - they live for two periods. The only diﬀerence between the islands is an utility
cost of finding a service sector job. There are two competitive production sectors, goods
and services. A government taxes labor and redistributes revenue as lump-sum payments.
Labor reallocation is driven, as in Rogerson (2008), by both non-homothetic preferences and
diﬀerential sectoral productivity growth.
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3.1 Households
I use a stationary overlapping generations model with a continuum of households. Household
consist of either one- or two-adult units. There is no bargaining, all households solve a unitary
utility.
Demographics Individuals, indexed with i 2 ff;mg for their gender, are either single or
married j 2 fs; pg. Whether a household has children is determined exogenously at the
beginning of period one. Households with children have two, k 2 f0; 2g, who live with their
parents when young. Individuals are endowed with an exogenous education level (high school,
some college, college or post-graduate), e 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g. For tractability, households types do
not change over time - they are born with a certain marital status, education level and number
of children.
Childcare Cost Children come with two types of costs: (1) an economy of scale parameter,
jk, reflecting the number of adults and children consuming all goods (purchased and produced
at home); and (2) specific childcare costs in terms of service consumption, d. This childcare
cost can either be purchased on the market or produced at home. In per consumption units,
childcare at home and in the market carry the same cost. To keep things tractable, women
that work in the labor market cannot produce childcare at home.
Disutility of Work To account for the variance in women’s working behavior, I assume
that working women draw a utility cost of working x which diﬀers by sector, x 2 fs; gg.
Women know the distribution, x  N(x ; x), when deciding to enter the labor market
or not. Disutility of work can be thought of not only containing preferences regarding work
environment or working colleagues, but also possible search eﬀort in finding a suitable job or
possible commuting time to work.
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Islands Men have no preference over employment by sector. For women, it is assumed,
that the service-intensive island has a smaller mean disutility of work in services, As < 
B
s ,
with the superscript denoting island type fA;Bg for the service- and manufacturing-intensive
island respectively. The disutility of work in the goods-producing sector is assumed to be
equal across islands. The motivation is simple: in an island where services are abundant,
it should be considerably easier to find a job with a pleasant work environment, potentially
shorter commuting times, etc. Individuals are born in one of the two islands and stay there
for their lifetime. The share of women born on each island is a factor, , of the the share of
men working in each sector - the more men (husbands) work in services, the more women are
born on the service-intensive island (island A) and have easy access to a service sector job.
Productivity Education and experience determine productivity. Eﬃciency market hours
are h^a(ha; e)  eaha, where ha are actual hours worked and ea is productivity at age a = 1; 2.
Productivity when old depends on working choices when young, e2 = e2(h1) - i.e., agents
accumulate work experience. If an individual works full-time (at least 20 percent of his/her
time), market productivity increases by a fixed percentage. On the flip side individuals that
do not work full-time lose productivity. Hourly wages when young are a function of an
individual’s education level (e) and (potentially) the sector of work (x), diﬀerentiated by
gender (i) to allow for discrimination or productivity diﬀerences, !1i;t = wte1i(e; x). When
old, second period, hourly wages are a function of past work experience, initial education
level and the sector of employment, !2i;t = wte2i(e; x; h1). The only measurable diﬀerences
between the sexes are market productivity (by sector) and wage discrimination. Concretely,
for a given education and hours profile, eaf  eam.
Preferences Each period, households, married or single, allocate time to: (1) the market
(hf ; hm); (2) home production (nf ; nm); and (3) leisure (`f ; `m). Household income is used to
purchase: (1) goods for consumption (cg), (2) goods for input into home production (n), (3)
services in the market (cs), and (4) if necessary, childcare (d). The household also consumes
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a home-produced service-substitute. Home-services (cn) are produced with time and goods
as inputs.
The household’s utility function with marital status j (dropping time/age subscripts) is,
u(C;L) =
(C=jk)
1 
1   +  j
`1 
1   : (1)
Households’ face a standard budget constraint,
pg (cg + n) + ps(cs + 1(hf>0;k>0)d) = 0;jky
1 1;jk + T; (2)
and a time allocation constraint,
1 = hi + ni + `i: (3)
Gross income is y = !mhm + !fhf if married and y = !ihi otherwise. The tax structure 
0y
(1 1) is a standard method of modeling tax levels (0) and progressivity (1). The par-
ticular advantage of this formulation is that levels and progressivity are independent (Holter,
Krueger and Stepanchuk, 2014). Taxes are allowed to vary both in levels and progressivity by
household type (marital status and children). Consumption (C) is the composite consumption
of services and goods,
C =
 
agc

g + (1  ag)F (c^s; c^n)
 1
 ; (4)
where F (c^s; c^n) is composite service consumption,
F (c^s; c^n) =

as

cs   1(hf>0;k>0)d

+ (1  as)

cn   1(hf=0;k>0)d
 1
: (5)
Market-services are composed of two parts, c^s = cs 1(hf>0;k>0)d, privately purchased services
and childcare. If the woman does not work, childcare is provided at home (1(hf=0;k>0)d). It is
assumed that, in terms of consumption, childcare at home and in the market are equivalent.
Home production is, as in Greenwood and Guner (2009), a CES function of goods and time,
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with total factor productivity An;t,
cn = An (an

n + (1  an)n)
1
 ; (6)
where total hours are a CES of spouses’ hours for a married couple,
n = ((nm)
n + (nf )
n)
1
n ; (7)
with 1 > n > 0 and n = ni for singles. Lastly, leisure of spouses are assumed to be
compliments; husbands and wives prefer spending some time together in leisure,5
` = ((`m)
` + (`f )
`)
1
` ; (8)
with ` < 0 and ` = `i for singles.
Decision Problem Given preferences and choices, only work experience when young aﬀects
the recursive decision problem. Old households solve the one period problem above, taking
into account past work experience through current eﬃciency units of labor (e2i(e; x; h1)).
The problem for young households with children is characterized by working on the extensive
margin and purchasing childcare services or staying home. For all other households it is
characterized by the full-time threshold (h1  0:2).
For young single men the state is determined by the education level only. Given the value
function Vm(e), men decide consumption and time allocation by maximizing,
Vm(e) = maxfcg ;n;cs;h;ng
u(C;L) + Vm(e
0);
subject to constraints (2) and (3), where e0 denotes the evolution of productivity conditional
5Empirical estimates shows that men and women work similar hours when accounting for both market and
home production. This is true not only in the cross-section but also over time across a set of OECD countries
(Fang and McDaniel, 2014).
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on hours worked when young.
Single women must additionally decide whether to search for a service sector job or not.
The state is determined by home-island location (I), the number of children (k) and education
level (e). Denote the job-specific value functions by V xf (I; k; e), where the superscript (x 2
fs; gg) denotes the sector. Alternatively, women could also choose not to work at all in the
labor market (hf = 0), then V 0f (I; k; e) with superscript 0 denoting the corresponding value
function. The value function of a single woman in island I is,
Vf (I; k; e) = maxfV 0f (I; k; e); V sf (I; k; e)  s; V gf (I; k; e)  gg;
where x  N(Ix ; 2x) is her specific disutility of work by sector, which are drawn from
island-specific distributions with diﬀering average costs. For each distinct option the value
function follows from the maximization problem conditional on sector choice, x,
V xf (I; k; e) = maxfcg ;n;cs;h;ng
u(C;L) + Vf (I; 0; e
0);
subject to constraints (2) and (3). The state variables update according to the hours worked
when young (e0), the fact that children form their own households in period two (k = 0) and
that agents do not move across islands (I 0 = I).
The problem of a young married household is almost identical to a single female house-
hold with the same state variables. Given value function Vp(I; k; em; ef ) for young married
households, the household decides whether the wife should work and in which sector,
Vp(I; k; em; ef ) = maxfV 0p (I; k; em; ef ); V sp (I; k; em; ef )  s; V gp (I; k; em; ef )  gg:
The households’ consumption, time allocation and members’ full-time working status follow
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from maximizing,
V xp (I; k; em; ef ) = maxfcg ;n;cs;hm;hf ;nm;nfg
u(C;L) + Vp(I; 0; e
0
m; e
0
f )
subject to constraints (2) and (3). State variables update as in the single household problems.
3.2 Production
The competitive sectors use labor and machines to produce final goods and services fYg; Ysg.
Although employment opportunities by sector are island specific, the economy employs an
aggregate production function. The final sectoral output is Cobb-Douglas in machines, x
and aggregate labor, Lx,
Yx;t = A
1 
x;t 

x;tL
1 
x;t for x = g; s: (9)
Total factor productivity for each sector x is given by Ax;t, and grows at rate x, i.e., Ax;t+1 =
(1+x)Ax;t. Dropping time subscripts, final goods producers make the static choice of hiring
eﬃciency units of labor (Lx) at wage rate wx and purchase machines (x) at prices px to
maximize profits,
max
x;Lx
pxYx   pxx   wxLx: (10)
Eﬃciency units of labor are Lx =
P
I
P
i;j;k;e 
I
ijkeh^
I
ijk(h; e; x), with 
I
ijke the share of individ-
uals of gender i, marital status j, children k, and productivity level ea on island I.6 Machines
are supplied by monopolists. Monopolists maximize profits,
max
x
pxx   pgx; (11)
where each unit of machine requires one unit of the final goods production Yg. Given perfect
mobility of labor across sectors, wage rates equalize at w = wx.
6Since the disutility of work is a fixed cost paid only if working, all agents of a certain type (defined by
i; j; k; e) work the same hours within sector x conditional on working.
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3.3 Government
The government, who solves a balanced budget, taxes individuals’ labor income with a tax
schedule of f0;jk; 1;jkg depending on marital status j and number of children k, in addition
to collecting all monopolists’ profits x;t. Tax revenues are rebated to households as a lump-
sum transfer, T , such that rebates equal transfers, Rt+s;t+g;t = Tt: Household tax revenue
is,
Rt =
X
I
X
x
X
i;j;k;e
I;xijkey
I;x
ijke

1  0;jk

yI;xijke
 1;jk
;
where I;xijke is the share of individuals of gender i, marital status j, children k, and productivity
level ea with the superscripts denoting the island I, and the working choice, x = f0; s; gg not
working, working in services or in the goods sector.
3.4 Equilibrium
An equilibrium, given market prices fwt; pg;t; ps;t; pg;t; ps;tg, and government prices f0;jk; 1;jkg,
consists of households’ allocation fcg;t; n;t; cs;t; hm;t; hf;t; nm;t; nf;tg, firm output fYg;t; Ys;tg,
monopolist output fg;t; s;tg and government allocation Tt such that for all t:
1. fcg;t; n;t; cs;t; hm;t; hf;t; nm;t; nf;tg solves each (gender/marital status, children, produc-
tivity, island) household problem;
2. fg;t; s;tg solves the monopolist problem;
3. fTtg solves the government problem; and
4. Markets clear, with
a. The labor market, Lsx;t = Ldx;t for x = g; s;
b. The goods market, Cg;t +Kn;t + g;t + s;t = Yg;t; and
c. The service market, Cs;t +Ds;t = Ys;t.
17
For notational simplicity aggregates of consumption (goods, Cg;t, capital for home production,
Kn;t, market services, Cs;t, and market-childcare, Ds;t) are summed for all gender/marital
types, number of children and productivity levels, e.g., aggregate goods consumption,
Cg;t =
X
I
X
x
X
i;j;k;e
I;xijkec
I;x
g;ijke;t: (12)
4 Analytical Results
The intertemporal decision only pretains to the discrete choice of working at least full-time
or not. For exposition it is instructive to study the simpler static maximization problem (or
the old household problem).7 Assuming individuals have market productivity ei;t or market
income yi;t = !i;thi;t = wtei;thi;t, a household makes four choices on: (1) home production,
(2) service consumption, (3) goods consumption, and (4) leisure. All consumption allocations
for any given after-tax income can be solved analytically in terms of time allocated to home
production, n.8 Time subscripts are omitted for all derivations.
Home-Produced Services Spouses allocate time to home production according to relative
productivity in the labor market,
nf
nm
=

em
ef
 1
1 n
| {z }

n
; (13)
and relative time to leisure by,
`f
`m
=

nf
nm
 1 n
1 `
=

em
ef
 1
1 `
: (14)
Given imperfect substitutability in home hours (0 < n < 1) and complementarity in leisure
(` < 0) the more productive spouse spends relatively less time in home production (and
7The static old age problem is further simplified, by not having any children at home.
8First order conditions can be found in Appendix O:1.
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consequently more in market production).9
Assuming interior solutions for all hours, hf ; hm > 0, and productivity, em > ef , old-age
households produce services at home by allocating goods and time at the ratio,
n
n
=

an
1  an
pn
pg
(
nn + 1)
n 1
n
 1
1 
| {z }


: (15)
Goods in home production are a function of home hours, n = 
n, where home production
is,
cn = An (an


 + (1  an))
1
 n: (16)
The price pn = 0;jk(1  1;jk)y 1;jk!m is an implicit home production price for time usage.
As this price increases through higher wages or lower taxes, the more costly it becomes to
work at home (or the more goods relative to time are used in home production). A drop in
tax levels (rising 0;jk) results in a proportional increase of the home price across household
types. A drop in progressivity (falling 1;jk) has, in addition, an impact at the margin, which
is larger for high income households. Consequently, with a fall in progressivity, dual-earning
households are more willing/able to substitute hours for capital than one-person households.
A lower goods price (pg) also leads to less hours worked at home. In contrast, relative high
hours at home, due to low labor market productivity (
n), result in lower goods purchases.10
In summary, home production hours increase with higher taxes and lower wages/productivity.
Since, two person households can specialize, they can use relatively more hours in home pro-
duction. This implies that changes in tax levels versus progressivity have diﬀerent eﬀects
across household types (married versus single).
9Note this is equivalent to models without home production, where spouses are assumed to have diﬀerent
disutilities of working (e.g., see Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura, 2013).
10A detailed discussion of the level of leisure is omitted here since his result is standard - higher taxes lead
to more leisure. In addition, if the curvature on consumption is smaller than on leisure, 0 <  < , wealthier
households allocate more time to leisure.
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Composite Service Consumption Using home production equation (16), market-service
consumption can also be written in terms of home production, c^s = 
scn, where
cs
cn
=

as
(1  as) anAn
pg
ps
 
an + (1  an)
 
 1

 1
1 
| {z }

s
: (17)
As in Ngai and Pissarides (2008), services are marketized if cs=cn rises. For young house-
holds with children, the provision of childcare also matters, replacing cs and cn by c^s =
cs   1(hf>0;k>0)d or c^n = cn   1(hf=0;k>0)d. Children provide an additional force in the mar-
ketization of services if both parents work. If market- and home-services are gross substitutes
(0 <  < 1), more expensive inputs into home production (pg) have a direct positive eﬀect on
market work, as does a rise in 
. The second eﬀect follows from the imperfect substitutability
of market-services and home-services.
Direct Goods Consumption Using the market consumption allocation, goods consump-
tion can also be written in terms of home production, cg = 
gcs = 
g
scn, where
cg
cs
=
 
ag
(1  ag)as
ps
pg

cs
F (cs; cn)
 ! 11 
| {z }

g
: (18)
The relative consumption allocation is a function of relative prices (ps=pg) and relative market-
services to total service consumption (cs=F (cs; cn)).
Firm Allocation Monopolists’ profit maximization results in machine supply being a linear
function of labor and TFP in the goods sector,
x = 
2
1 AgLx: (19)
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Using equation (19) simplifies the production of goods and services to,
Yg = 
2
1 AgLg (20)
and
Ys = 
2
1 AgA
1 
s Ls: (21)
The final production functions are linear in labor. However, a rise in goods productivity (Ag)
matters for both outputs, but more so for goods production. Normalizing the price of goods
to one (pg = 1) gives the price of services as a function of productivity, ps =

Ag
As
1 
, and
the monopolist prices px =
1
 . The wage rate is a function of productivity in the goods sector,
wt = (1  )
2
1 Ag. Technical progress follows from increases in factor productivity, Ax. A
rise in AgAs leads to structural change or a fall in relative goods-to-service prices, and a rise in
wages.
Sectoral Labor Share Since aggregate consumption allocations follow from equation (12),
the model cannot be solved explicitly for sectoral labor shares. However, studying the diﬀerent
aggregate components is illustrative of the forces shaping a fall in the relative labor share.
Using market clearing and resource constraints , Yg = Cg +Kn + g + s and Ys = Cs +Ds,
the eﬃciency-unit labor share is,
Lg
Ls
=

As
Ag
1  "Cg +Kg
Cs +Ds
+

2
1 Ag(Lg + Ls)
Cs +Ds
#
: (22)
There are three components aﬀecting relative labor shares in this economy. A direct eﬀect
through exogenous technology change and two indirect feedback eﬀect through consumer
demands and machine requirements.
Whether relative goods-to-service consumption rises or falls with structural transformation
(the first term in brackets) depends on the marketization of services, which in turn depends
on tax schedules, relative labor productivities and childcare provisions. From equations (16)
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- (18), structural change should lead to a fall in the share of relative goods consumption,
(Cg +Kg) = (Cs +Ds), and, consequently, to an increase in the relative service labor share.
Pushing mothers into the labor market (e.g., through lower taxes) leads to an increase in
service consumption not only through an income eﬀect, but also a substitution eﬀect from
home produced childcare (and other home production) to market purchased childcare (and
home substitutes). In addition, the multiplicative eﬀect of structural transformation should
be larger in an economy where taxes are low and individuals have high labor productivity,
since marketization of services should be larger.
The second term in brackets is related to machine demand. Increased machine demand
dampens the eﬀect of an increase on the relative labor share, since machines are produced in
the goods sector, but required for output in both sectors (although the capital requirements
in services are smaller).
To summarize, there are three main parts, (1) structural change, (2) labor choices, and (3)
production requirements. The first eﬀect is straight-forward and present in standard models
of structural transformation. The second eﬀect is where the current paper fills a void in
determining whether ignoring dual households (the theory suggests marketization should be
small for one-adult households that cannot specialize) and tax progressivity is important. The
third eﬀect, also absent in early models of structural transformation, provides a dampening
eﬀect as capital is required in both goods and service production.
5 Calibration
To simulate the model I require: (1) approximations of tax schedules by marital status and
children, (2) productivity levels across men and women, and (3) population shares by house-
hold type. I use the OECD Committee on Fiscal Aﬀairs (1978) tax/benefit report to derive
the tax parameters (0;jk; 1;jk) for the US in 1977 and the OECD (2015b) tax-benefit model
to compute tax schedules in the 2000s for the US and Germany. Productivity levels and pop-
ulation shares are computed using the CPS. The remaining model parameters are calibrated
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to various 1977 US hour targets. While 1977 is the first year with detailed tax information
by marital status and children, the relevant trends (growth in market service share and home
production) show a natural break in the late 1970s (Moro, Moslehi and Tanaka, 2015), making
it an ideal starting point for the empirical exercise.
Tax Schedule The OECD tax database allows for the computation of tax payments by
marital status, number of children, and whether both spouses work or not. The OECD
Committee on Fiscal Aﬀairs (1978) reports gross income and after-tax income from 1974-
1976 for single and married households. Married households’ tax payments are reported
both for one and two working adults and zero or two children. For singles only, rates without
children are reported. Taxes paid as a “percent of average worker wage” are reported in a given
year.11 The OECD (2015b) tax-benefit model is used to compute tax schedules for the period
2001-2007, which is used as an approximation for 2009, thus omitting outlier observations
associated with the financial crisis.12 Using the information from the OECD Committee on
Fiscal Aﬀairs (1978) and OECD (2015b), tax schedules are computed by pooling years within
a decade by country, marital status and number of children,
log(yajk;t) = 0;jk;t + (1  1;jk;t) log(yjk;t) + jk;t; (23)
where yajk;t is after-tax income by marital status j 2 fs; p1; p2g and number of children k 2
f0; 2g. Marital status tax schedules distinguish whether both spouses (p2) or only one spouse
works (p1), since some countries penalize two-adult working households. Table 2 summarizes
the US tax parameters used in the simulation.13 Table 2 shows falling tax levels, but increasing
11For singles the tax computations are reported at 50, 100, and 200 percent of average wages. For married
couples tax payments are reported at 100, 133, 167, 200, and 400 percent. The 400 percent computations
assume each spouse earns a wage twice as high as the average worker in the economy, the remaining percentages
assume the primary worker earns 100 percent and the secondary workers wage increases from 0 to 100 percent.
12Results are not sensitive to the precise time period selected.
13Given that there is no information for singles with children in the 1970s, I compute those tax rates
by assuming that singles without children face the same tax/benefits penalties as married coupled without
children compared to married couples with 2 children, e.g., 0;s2;1977 = 0;p2;1977=0;p0;1977  0;s0;1977.
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progressivity from 1977 to 2009. Ignoring the top 1 percent of tax payers, which this study
does not capture, these changes are consistent with Petska, Strudler and Petska (n.d.) and
Piketty and Saez (2007) who show a flattening of progressivity at the top 1 percent over this
time period, but an increase in progressivity for the bottom 99 percent. In addition, OECD
tax estimates also include benefits mostly received at the bottom of the income distribution
(Piketty and Saez, 2007).
Table 2: US Tax Schedule
1970s 2000s
0;jk 1;jk 0;jk 1;jk
Single 0.757 0.100 0.749 0.111
Single-2 children 0.804 0.114 0.931 0.249
Married (p1) 0.818 0.124
Married (p1)-2 children 0.984 0.257
Married (p2) 0.791 0.103 0.805 0.125
Married (p2)-2 children 0.840 0.118 0.903 0.194
See notes in text for computation of tax schedule for singles with 2
children in 1977. There is no data to distinguish between p1 and p2
in 1977.
In order to also account for consumption taxes, the final after tax income is computed
using both income tax schedules and consumption tax rates, i.e.,
yat =
0;ty
(1 1;t)
t
1 + c
; (24)
where c is the average tax on consumption expenditures. Consumption tax is set to 9.1
percent in 1977 and 7.5 percent in 2009 for the US (McDaniel, 2011).
Productivity To compute productivity, a similar approach as in Guner, Kaygusuz and
Ventura (2013) is used. When young (individuals aged 25-44), productivity levels are set to
average weekly wages of full-time workers (by gender/education) relative to the mean weekly
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wage for a given year.14
For the old, productivity levels are computed in two ways. For workers that did not work
full-time when young, productivity levels decrease by a factor , which is calibrated to match
the labor force participation of older women (see below). For individuals that work when
young, I compute the growth rate of wages by education level for men using the CPS. The
growth rate is computed using average weekly wages of individuals aged 25-44 to individuals
aged 45-64 within a given year. For women, I use this same wage growth rate. Using the
male wage growth rate avoids any issue of selection or weak labor force attachment due to
children, etc. The resulting productivity levels are listed in Appendix A.
In addition, the simulations also allow for productivity diﬀerences of women across sectors.
Women earn the standard wage rate in services, wt, but gwt in goods production. I take
estimates of g from wage diﬀerences found in the CPS sample (see Figure 3). For benchmark
results g = 0:932, the average gap of the selection corrected gender pay gap from 1977 to
2009.
Marital Status The share of individuals in the four education levels without and with
children is used to approximate shares of singles with zero or two children in the model.
While there is a small share of single men with children in the data, it is negligible for the
US and rounded to zero. Consistent with US data in 1977, there are more women than men
in the economy. Only individuals that are currently married in the CPS are classified as such
in the model.15 Given four education types by gender, there are 16 types of married couples.
The degree of assortative matching is directly taken from the data - for actual shares see
Appendix A.
A Priori Parameters While a number of parameters are set directly (see Table 3), the
remainder are calibrated (see Table 4). In the model one can either normalize productivity
14Full-time workers are defined as individuals that work at least 1,750 hours per year.
15While it is possible to also distinguish cohabitation in later years, there is no such information in the
1970s.
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levels in 1977, fAg; As; Ang, or consumption share parameters, fag; as; ang. I choose a combi-
nation given computational time requirements. The consumption share on goods, ag = 0:07,
is taken from Rogerson (2008), and the productivity in the goods sector, Ag;1977, is calibrated
to match the relative industry sector hours worked in 1977.16 In all other sectors, productivity
is set to one, As;1977 = An;1977 = 1. Productivity growth rates, x, where the next period’s
productivity is Ax;t+1 = (1 + x)Ax;t, are computed using value added statistics by sector
from the 10-sector database and are similar to other paper estimates. For example, goods
sector TFP versus service sector TFP growth is, g   s = 0:0123, identical to the estimate
by Ngai and Petrongolo (2015). The capital share is set to one-third in market production
( = :33). Following estimates by Bridgman (2013) for 1980 onward, home productivity grows
at n = 0:002. I furthermore assume that average wages grow at 1.5 percent per annum.
The parameters governing the elasticity of home- and market-services ( 11 ), the elasticity
between goods and services ( 11 ), the elasticity of home hours to capital goods (
1
1  ), and
the elasticity of female to male hours ( 11 n ), are taken from previous studies. Various studies
have estimated  on microeconomic and macroeconomic data. The resulting elasticities vary
from 1.6 to 2.0 (Rupert, Rogerson and Wright, 1995), depending on whether households are
married, single females or single males. Aguiar and Hurst (2007) find an elasticity of 1.8
and Chang and Schorfheide (2003) of 2.3, I use  = 0:565 corresponding to an elasticity of
2:3. Consistent with the literature, the elasticity of goods to services is set to  0:1, implying
an  =  9:0. That is, Ngai and Pissarides (2008) argue that price elasticities for the entire
service sector are between  0:3 and  0:06, and Herrendorf, Rogerson and Valentinyi (2013),
using value added production functions, find it to be as low as  0:002. The elasticity of
substitution between time and home capital is set to  = 0:189 (Greenwood and Guner,
2009). The elasticity of substitution is set to n = 0:67 (Knowles, 2013). Childcare cost is set
to 9 percent of average household income each period (Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura, 2013).
The curvature on consumption is set to a standard value of  = 1:5 and the annual discount
16A calibration of ag while fixing Ag = 1 does not alter the results of the paper. However, given that ag is
close to zero, the natural boundary, the calibration does take longer to converge.
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Table 3: A Priori Parameters
Value Source
Prior Values
As 1.0 normalized
An 1.0 normalized
ag 0.07 Rogerson (2008)
n 0.002 Bridgman (2013)
w 0.015 see text
 0.33 Kaldor (1957)
 0.565 Chang and Schorfheide (2003)
 -9.0 Ngai and Pissarides (2008)
 0.189 Greenwood and Guner (2009)
n 0.67 Knowles (2013)
d 0:09 yt Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura (2013)
 1.5
 0:9820
jk f1:0; 1:6; 1:5; 2:1g Grabka and Frick (2010)
Estimated
g 0.0245 10-sector database
s 0.0121 10-sector database
g 0.932 CPS 1977-2010
factor is set to 0:98. Economies of scales are taken from Grabka and Frick (2010), with recent
OECD economy of scale calculations assuming the second adult to be equivalent to adding
another “half-adult” to consumption and every additional child adding 0.3 to consumption.
Calibrated Parameters The remaining parameters, f p;  s; as; an; ; d; As ; Bs ; s ; g ;
g ; Ag; `; ; g are calibrated to match 1977 data targets listed in Table 4. The share of
women born to the service-intensive island A (Hs;t=(Ht)) is set to match the US share of
women married to a man working in the service sector in 1977 given locational constraints
discussed in Section 2. This functional form suggests that the more agents work in services,
the more households are born on island A. All other parameters are estimated jointly to
match the data targets listed. Though estimation is done jointly, some targets are more
informative for certain parameters then others. Most targets are a measure of hours or labor
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force participation. For example, goods sector productivity (Ag) is set to match the relative
labor share in industry to services (Hg=Hs). The elasticity of substitution in leisure ` is
calibrated to match relative leisure hours of men and women (Aguiar and Hurst, 2007).17
The change in productivity  for individuals working less than full-time is set to match the
relatively (compared to young women) higher rates of non-participation of older married
women ( NILF2).
Table 4: Calibrated Parameters
Value US Data Model Source
Ag;1977 4.095 78.3 78.3 industry-to-service hours
` -7.021 46.5 47.9 relative male leisure hours
an 0.458 39.4 41.6 housewives’ hours
as 0.631 56.7 52.5 single women’s home/market hours
 p 0.510 39.4 44.6 married men’s hours
 s 1.503 32.5 29.1 single men’s hours
 2.744 0.500 0.485 male Frisch elasticity
As 2.105 74.8 68.9 women in services
Bs 3.834 24.8 19.0 married women’s hours in services
s 0.423 48.9 45.0 NILF young women
g 1.312 86.8 84.4 relative participation island B/A
g 2.599 77.9 83.6 women in services island B/A
 0.014 55.9 54.7 NILF older women
 0.833 0.467 0.461 men in industry
Having pinned down relative leisure hours through the elasticity, home hours of housewives
(with no market hours) and market hours of married men should determine the weights of
home production (an) and leisure ( p).18 Similarly, market hours of single men and home-to-
market hours of single women should fix the weight of leisure for singles ( s) and the weight
of market versus home-services (as). The curvature on leisure () is set by matching the male
17There are various papers that have pointed out the complementarity of leisure for spouses (e.g., see
Schirle, 2008), however there is no reliable estimate for the elasticity.
18There is certain overlap between targets and parameters, e.g., the hours of married men and the rate of
non-participation of married women could also be informative on the curvature of leisure. The discussion here
should only be viewed as motivating evidence for the inclusion of each target.
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Frisch elasticity.19
The disutility of work parameters fAs ; Bs ; gg are calibrated to match the non-participation
of young women, the hours worked in services of married women, and the labor force partici-
pation gap of women that live on the service-intensive island versus the goods-intensive island.
Given the definition of and island, by the husbands’ sectoral choice, the last target is the ratio
across islands of the labor force participation of women, conditional on their husbands work-
ing in services or industry.20 Lastly, I use the aggregate relative service share of employed
women and the diﬀerence of this labor share across the two islands to fix the dispersion of
disutilities (fs ; gg).
The model does well in matching most targets (see Table 4). All results report hours in
weekly working hours (not eﬃciency-units), with all other statistics are presented in percent-
age points.21 The biggest discrepancy between the data and model is an underestimation
of the actual hours married women work in services. In trying to generate a larger female
participation the model naturally increases married men’s market hours, but the resulting
estimate is within 15 percent of the data target. A similar argument holds for the slightly
lower single male hours. As the model tries to match the relative home-to-market hours of
single women, the model also depresses single male hours. The inability to match hours in
the service sector for married women can largely be attributed to allowing full flexibility on
the intensive margin of hours from (0; 1).22 Lastly, the aggregate relative share of women in
services is slightly underestimated as the model tries to match island diﬀerences - a higher
aggregate share requires a smaller gap across islands.
19The Frisch elasticity is the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the wages, keeping the marginal
utility of consumption constant, `t
ht
1

, (Olovsson, 2009). In the text I report the average across diﬀerent
household types, e.g., all single/married men of all education types.
20In US data, this ratio is robust when conditioning on education levels.
21Throughout the paper all data points are computed using 5-year moving averages.
22This is corroborated by a simulation restricting individuals to work at least 1.5 days per week (0:12; 1)
(see Table O.1 in Appendix O.2.1).
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6 Results
Before studying the two research questions (regarding taxes, women and the service sector),
it is important to verify that the base model produces time trends in line with US data. The
benchmark model generates sizable trends over time, mostly in line with US magnitudes,
even though no statistics beyond 1977 are included as targets. Table 5 reports trends for (1)
hours in the labor market, (2) sectoral hours, (3) participation rates, (4) leisure hours, and
(5) Frisch elasticities.
Table 5: US Time Trends
1977 2009 Change
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Male Hours 38.0 42.0 36.4 35.7 -1.6 -6.2
Female Hours 16.3 11.0 26.0 17.8 9.7 6.9
Single Male Hours 32.5? 29.1 32.1 26.4 -0.4 -2.7
Married Male Hours 39.4? 44.6 38.3 39.9 -1.1 -4.7
Single Female Hours 26.3 18.2 30.3 19.5 4.0 1.3
Married Female Hours 13.9 9.1 24.0 17.1 10.2 8.0
Industry-to-Service Hours 78.3? 78.3 41.6 49.7 -36.8 -28.7
Women Share in Services (%) 74.8? 68.9 86.6 71.2 11.8 2.4
NILF Married Women (%) 51.9 49.9 29.6 43.0 -22.3 -6.9
LFP Married Women Island A (%) 58.0 54.7 74.0 61.1 16.0 6.4
LFP Married Women Island B (%) 50.6 46.1 68.7 51.9 18.1 5.7
Male Leisure Hours 42.6 53.8 47.0 60.2 4.4 6.4
Female Leisure Hours 49.1 58.5 52.6 63.4 3.5 4.9
Male Frisch elasticity 0.5? 0.5 0.6
Female Frisch elasticity 2.1 1.3
Married Female Frisch elasticity 2.3 1.3 53 % 43%
Targets used in the calibration are marked with ?.
The large fall in male hours (-1.6 weekly hours in the data versus -6.2 in the model) is
oﬀset by a rise in leisure hours for single and married men (4.4. versus 6.4 weekly hours in
the model). The rise in leisure hours is driven by a standard income-substitution eﬀect as
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wages grow (due to increased productivity/educational attainment and wage growth). Three-
quarters of the rise in female hours is replicated (with 9.5 versus 6.9 weekly hour increase in
data versus model). This rise is mostly due to changes in married women’s hours (9.8 versus
8.0 weekly hours in the data versus model), accounting for close to four-fifths of the change.
Nonetheless, the model also explains one-third of the trend in single female hours (4.0 versus
1.3 weekly hours).23
The benchmark also generates 78 percent of the fall in industry-to-service hours (-36.8
versus -28.7 percentage points). Additionally, the share of women working in services increases
in both the model and data. However, the model can only generate one-fifth of the increase
(11.8 percent in the data versus 2.4 percent in the model).
The fall in non-participation of married women is partially matched. By 2009, 22.3 percent
more women worked in the labor market in the US compared with 1977. The change is 6.9
percent in the model or about one-third. The model generates only a small convergence of
participation across islands. That is, female labor force participation across the two islands
increases, but by 16.0 versus 6.4 percentage points for island A and 18.1 versus 5.7 percentage
points for island B, or the equivalent of 40- and 32-percent of the total change is captured by
the model, respectively.24
While only relative leisure hours are targeted, the model also generates a sizable increase
in total leisure hours, similar to the data. Aguiar and Hurst (2007) report a 4.4 hour per
week increase for men and 3.5 hour per week for women. Similarly, the model also reports a
smaller increase for women than men of 4.9 and 6.4 hours per week, respectively. That is, in
relative magnitudes of leisure across gender, the model replicates the total “catch-up” of men
(0.73 versus 0.80 percentage points in data and model).
Lastly, micro estimates for male Frisch elasticities range from 0 to 0.5 for men and 0.5 to
23 The female labor force participation literature has found changes in the closing gender gap, returns to
experience, service employment, and improvements in home technology matter to varying degrees in closing
the gap between men and women. The results here are aligned with a substantial part of this literature. A
detailed discussion of the driving forces can be found in the Online Appendix O.2.2.
24A detailed discussion of the island mechanism can be found in the Online Appendix O.2.3.
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2.2 for women (for a survey on Frisch elasticities see Reichling and Whalen, 2012). Having
targeted a male Frisch elasticity of 0.5, the model generates an elasticity of 0.6 in 2009. The
resulting Frisch elasticities for women are 2.1 and 1.3 in 1977 and 2009, respectively. In range
with Blau and Kahn (2007), who report a fall in married women’s elasticity of 50 to 56 percent
from 1980 to 2000, the model generates a fall of 43 percent for married women from 1977 to
2009 (2.3 to 1.3).
In summary, the model does well in replicating female and service hour trends in the data.
The benchmark misses the hours trends for men, due to relatively low home participation and
an oversupply of leisure hours. In addition, the convergence of islands and the rise of women
in services is subdued. However, as the experiment in Appendix O.2.1 (Table O.1) shows,
the lack of convergence across islands, along with the slower increase in the share of women
in the service sector and within the aggregate labor force, is likely driven by a combination
of the choice set in hours worked (ht;g 2 [0; 1]) and the fixed disutility of finding a service
sector job over time (As and 
B
s are time invariant). Thus, I view the results in Table 5 as
a conservative benchmark.
6.1 Taxes: Progressivity and Levels
Prescott (2004) first suggested that higher taxes could explain diﬀerences in hours worked
between the US and Europe. His original analysis, using a representative single agent model,
relied on relatively large Frisch elasticities to explain cross-country diﬀerences. Including
secondary worker decisions, the modified model presented here does well in matching trends
in hours for the US over time with Frisch elasticities that fall within micro estimates.
Using the benchmark simulation, I conduct two experiments to see the eﬀect of higher
taxes (both in levels and progressivity) and explore the diﬀering eﬀects between increasing
levels versus progressivity. Actual German taxes are computed from the OECD (2015b) tax-
benefit data as in the US. Germany is chosen as a representative tax regime in Continental
Europe (Holter, Krueger and Stepanchuk, 2014). Table 6 summarizes the tax schedule.
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Table 6: German Tax Schedule
DE Level DE
0;jk 1;jk 0;jk 1;jk
Single 0.608 0.136
0.727 0.000
Single-2 children 0.835 0.302
Married (p1) 0.741 0.183
Married (p1)-2 children 0.890 0.284
Married (p2) 0.676 0.180
Married (p2)-2 children 0.774 0.232
See notes in text for computation of tax schedules. For column
(3)-(4) all household types face the same tax schedule.
Compared to the US, Germany has taxes that are both higher in levels and in progressivity.
However, there are some diﬀerences across marital status and children, with Germany showing
relatively more generosity in terms of taxes and benefits towards families (see Figure 4). In
a second experiment, in order to disentangle diﬀerences between levels and progressivity,
I compute hypothetical tax schedules that produce the same average tax burden as with
German tax schedules by only adjusting levels and setting progressivity to zero. This linear
tax schedule is summarized in the two rightmost columns of Table 6.
Figure 5 shows how male and (married) female market, home and leisure hours are aﬀected
by higher taxes (and higher levels). Taxes distort (decrease) both male and female hours.
With the German tax schedule, male market hours fall by an additional 3.1 weekly hours
compared to the benchmark. These taxes also roughly half the increase in married women’s
market hours - married women work 3.8 hours less per week than in the 2009 benchmark.
Single women seem to be more aﬀected by a rise in taxes compared to married women, as
total female market work falls an additional 0.3 hours per week.
Setting progressivity to zero and only adjusting tax levels has a smaller impact on market
hours for both genders. However, while married female market hours contract substantially
less (1.3 hours per week compared to the benchmark), total female market hours fall by an
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Figure 4: German versus US Tax Functions
additional one hour per week (2.3 versus 1.3 hours). That is, single women react similarly
across the two tax experiments, with market work (not pictured) falling by 4.8 hours per week
in the first experiment and by 4.6 hours per week in the second experiment. Equation (15)
provides insight, showing that a drop in progressivity raises the home price relatively more for
high income (dual-earning) households. Ergo, more married women enter the labor market
by eliminating progressivity.
Comparing the change in home versus leisure hours across the two experiments shows
diﬀerences in the underlying mechanisms (income versus substitution) driving low market
hours. With zero progressivity, leisure allocations are almost unchanged from the benchmark.
With high progressivity, individuals shift more hours toward leisure time and, to a lesser
degree, home production. This is consistent with Duernecker and Herrendorf (2014) who
show that cross-country diﬀerences in hours stem from a rise in leisure, not home production.
Those results follow from comparing France, a country with high tax progressivity, to the US.
Here, this eﬀect results from diﬀerent reactions by poor and rich households. With German
taxes rich households decrease their labor supply and shift hours to leisure time, while with
flat taxes poor households shift their hours to home production. Poor households (single
women) are the “losers” and rich households (educated married couples) are the “winners”
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Figure 5: Tax Eﬀects
of a move to flat taxes.25 In terms of hours, single females increase their home work by an
additional 0.8 hours per week when moving from German tax schedules to a flat tax. Married
couples have an almost identical increase in home hours between the two tax experiments
(3.75 versus 3.7 hours increase per week compared to the benchmark).
In summary, taxes have a large negative eﬀect on hours worked. The eﬀect on hours
diﬀers across household types when modeling tax diﬀerences in levels or in both levels and
progressivity. As the substitution of home production to market services diﬀers considerably
across tax scenarios, a detailed tax schedule is required in order to provide estimates for the
eﬀect of women’s employment changes on the increasing size of the service sector. Results on
married women’s hours suggests that ignoring progressivity could lead to an overestimate of
the eﬀect of women on the size of the service sector.
25Welfare computations are available upon request.
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6.2 Women, Taxes and the Rise of Services
One aim of this study is to understand the importance of rising female labor hours in ex-
plaining the size of the service sector and its interaction with diﬀerent tax regimes. Since the
benchmark model does generate sizable labor market changes from 1977 to 2009 and diﬀerent
tax regimes have a sizable (but varying) impact on hours, the model is suitable to study the
feedback eﬀects between women, taxes and the rise of the service sector.
It the spirit of an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, it is possible to decompose the change
in relative hours from Equation (22) by the exogenous technology component, machine de-
mand, and relative goods to market service consumption. The change in relative hours,
T 0(Lg;t=Ls;t), from time period 0 to T is,
T 0
Lg;t
Ls;t
= (AT  A0)X + (AT  A0)C + (XT  X0)A+ (CT   C0)A; (25)
where At =

As
Ag
1 
, Xt =

2
1 Ag(Lg+Ls)
C^s
, Ct =
Lg
Ls
=
Cg+Kg
C^s
and A = AT+A02 , etc. The
first two terms of Equation (25) capture changes due to a relative productivity increase in
the goods sector, with the first accounting for the machine related change and the second for
the consumption related change. The last two terms capture changes due to demand shifts
by machines and end consumers, respectively.
Table 7 Row (1) shows the corresponding decomposition for the benchmark. The con-
sumption components (both technology and demand changes) account for 89 percent of the
total fall in relative hours. Individually, changes due to technology changes due to technol-
ogy and household demand account for 62- and 27-percent, respectively. As suggested by
the theory, changes in machine demand lead to a rise in relative industry hours - the eﬀect
is 14 percent. The remaining quarter is accounted for by changes in technology related to
the machine demand component. Rows (2) and (3) repeat the exercise with the two higher
tax regimes. Taxes have a large negative impact on relative consumption (last column) and,
therefore, relative industry-to-service hours, which are 13 (100  87) and 8 (100  92) percent
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smaller, respectively. Given the smaller response in market hours to a flat tax, the fall in
the household demand component is smaller and the fall in industry-to-service hours is larger
than with the German tax schedule.
Table 7: Industry to Service Decomposition
Case Total TechX TechC DX DC
Benchmark (1) 100 25 62 -14 27
DE Tax (2) 87 25 64 -16 13
Level DE Tax (3) 92 25 63 -15 18
See notes in text for computation.
Since consumption plays a substantial role (close to one-third) in accounting for the change
in industry-to-service hours, Figure 6 shows the consumption component generated by diﬀer-
ent types of households (married, single female or male). That is, each column reports the
“partial equilibrium” results of Table 7 assuming only one type of household (e.g., married)
changes their consumption behavior over time. The results highlight what a model without
married households would be missing. In the benchmark, a fall in relative goods-to-service
consumption of single males can only account for 41 percent (11=27) of the consumption com-
ponent aﬀecting relative industry-to-service hours compared to 82 percent (23=27) of married
households. Single females have a similar eﬀect as single males, accounting for 46 percent of
the total. The last column reports results for changing population shares with all consumption
levels remaining at their 1977 levels. This experiment now only accounts for 21 percent (6=23)
of the consumption component. That is, changes in actual consumption matter. Moreover,
married households make a large adjustment in their consumption portfolio as women enter
the labor market. For single households the margin of adjustment is small. The possibility of
a large adjustment comes from less specialized households (market versus home production)
and outsourcing home production to the market in the form of market produced services.
The two tax experiments show similar relative contributions with two caveats. First,
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Figure 6: Household Specific Consumption Decomposition
with the German tax schedule, single women now can account for 64 percent (9=13) of the
consumption component. The fall in goods purchases is (in percentage terms) relatively
large for single women in both high tax scenarios, as hours shift from the market to home
production. However, the fall in service consumption for young single women (mothers) is
larger in the flat tax scenario, as single women increase home hours even further, largely due
to a shift from purchased childcare to home produced childcare (this is also reflected in the
higher home hours as shown in Section 6.1). Second, single men can account for a larger share
of changes in the relative consumption demand component in a model with flat taxes.
On the other hand, how do women, in particular, contribute to this fall in relative in-
dustry hours? To assess the contribution of women’s labor choices on the service sector, the
2009 economy is solved with diﬀerent assumptions. Men’s labor market choices are always
unchanged from the benchmark, while various separate scenarios are computed for women.
In Case (2) of Table 8, women’s market and home hours are fixed to the 1977 values. This
38
exercise captures the total eﬀect of women having entered the labor market by 2009. In Case
(3), women’s market hours are fixed to 1977 choices, but home hours are left at the 2009 value.
This counterfactual captures the importance of increased disposable income due to working
women. Case (4) does the opposite, setting market hours to 2009 and home hours to 1977
levels, capturing the importance of substituting home-produced services for market-services
- the substitution eﬀect. Since family composition may matter for part of the rise in service
marketization, case (5) fixes marriage (sorting), children and educational attainment to 1977.
The last three rows decompose the combined eﬀects by assuming family composition, as well
as hours (home and market), remain at their 1977 level (combining Case (2) and (5) with one
of the three tax regimes). Given hours, a new general equilibrium is computed in each row,
where households re-optimize by choosing kg, cg and cs. Columns report the contribution of
each factor to Equation (25), with the first column reporting the total eﬀect on the relative
industry-to-service hours.
Table 8: Counterfactuals of Industry to Service Decomposition
Case Total TechX TechC DX DC
Benchmark (1) 100 25 62 -14 27
Income & Home (2) 89 25 64 -15 15
Income (3) 99 25 62 -14 26
Home (4) 90 25 64 -15 16
Family (5) 91 25 64 -15 18
Combined (2) & (5) 78 25 66 -17 3
Combined DE (2) & (5) 68 26 69 -18 -8
Combined Level DE (2) & (5) 70 26 68 -18 -6
See notes in text for computation.
Table 8 shows the sizable impact of women’s entry into the labor market on market-service
consumption and relative service sector employment (in hours). Rows (2)-(4) show the main
shift coming through a decrease in home hours. Home hours fixed at the 1977 level, leading
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to less marketization of services, produces a 10 percent smaller fall in relative industry-to-
service hours. Row (5) shows that changes in family structure can have large eﬀects as well,
only slightly smaller in magnitudes than Row (4). From the last three rows we see that
changes in family composition coupled with women’s working choices can account for almost
one quarter of the fall in relative industry hours over time under US taxes. Counterfactuals
where higher tax regimes are combined with family composition, income and hours from 1977,
generate roughly two-thirds of the fall in relative industry-to-service hours. Thus, a favorable
tax environment is essential in generating a large hours response and a large service sector.
Moreover, progressivity is more damaging to the rise in services compared to a flat tax. This
is largely due to the composition of households - i.e., a shift to market work for married
households/women results in a large demand for market produced services.
7 Conclusion
This paper uses a standard multi-sector model with three major modifications: (1) households
are either two-member households or single, (2) men and women diﬀer in their productivity
and preferences across sectors, and (3) households face tax schedules with level and progres-
sivity diﬀerences. The model does well in accounting for trends in the labor market over time,
which makes the model suitable to measure the feedback eﬀect of women entering the labor
market on the size of the service economy. The resulting estimates are non-negligible, with
US women accounting for up-to one-quarter of the growth in relative service hours. The ma-
jority of the feedback eﬀect comes from married women entering the work force and shifting
consumption from the home to the market (e.g., childcare services, restaurant meals), and a
change in household composition (e.g., marital structure, education levels, children).
While this study includes some simplifying assumptions (e.g., abstracting from endogenous
family formation or education), it fills a significant gap in the current literature by analyzing
the combined eﬀects of taxation, structural change, and women’s work. The model highlights
the importance of favorable tax systems and the diﬀerences between revenue-equivalent flat
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and progressive tax regimes. Taxes have a large negative impact on women’s market hours
and the size of the service economy. German taxes in the US would have led to only half the
rise in (married) women’s market hours for the US economy and relative industry-to-service
hours would be up-to 13 percent higher. Combining changes in women’s working behavior and
family structures with German-style taxes would lead to 32 percent higher industry-to-service
hours - a sizable change.
Progressivity in taxes has larger negative market outcomes than flat taxes, mostly due to
a shift toward leisure in the former. Overall, the results presented here suggest that modeling
only linear tax diﬀerences across countries may underestimate the eﬀect of taxes on leisure
hours, but overestimate the eﬀect on home hours. Furthermore, modeling the tax schedules
with heterogeneity in terms of two-adult versus single households is essential, as the results
decomposed by household types clearly indicate.
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A Data Appendix: Simulation Input
This appendix provides the required CPS inputs (productivity levels and marital/parental
shares) of the US population in 1977 and 2009 for the simulation procedure.
Table 9: Productivity Levels
HS SC C PG
Young
1978 Male 0.911 1.015 1.141 1.243
Female 0.557 0.664 0.772 1.106
2009 Male 0.672 0.860 1.187 1.487
Female 0.518 0.703 1.034 1.450
Old
1978 Male 0.961 1.174 1.481 1.443
Female 0.588 0.768 1.002 1.284
2009 Male 0.788 1.009 1.364 1.666
Female 0.607 0.825 1.188 1.625
See notes in text for computation of full-time workers
productivity levels.
Table 10: Single Female Shares
HS SC C PG
1978 No Children 0.031 0.011 0.010 0.012
2 Children 0.084 0.018 0.005 0.004
2009 No Children 0.025 0.028 0.032 0.019
2 Children 0.062 0.051 0.018 0.006
See notes in text for computation of population shares.
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Table 11: Single Male Shares
HS SC C PG
1978 0.070 0.029 0.019 0.022
2009 0.106 0.065 0.045 0.018
See notes in text for computation of population
shares.
Table 12: Married Shares - No Children
Female
HS SC C PG
HS Male
1978 0.024 0.005 0.003 0.001
2009 0.014 0.003 0.001 0.000
SC Male
1978 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
2009 0.007 0.008 0.004 0.001
C Male
1978 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003
2009 0.004 0.006 0.014 0.005
PG Male
1978 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005
2009 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.008
See notes in text for computation of population
shares.
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Table 13: Married Shares - 2 Children
Female
HS SC C PG
HS Male
1978 0.317 0.063 0.029 0.015
2009 0.107 0.023 0.010 0.002
SC Male
1978 0.030 0.030 0.022 0.019
2009 0.041 0.054 0.021 0.005
C Male
1978 0.008 0.009 0.024 0.027
2009 0.016 0.025 0.053 0.023
PG Male
1978 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.022
2009 0.005 0.009 0.022 0.027
See notes in text for computation of population
shares.
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SUPPLEMENTAL ONLINE APPENDIX
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
O.1 Mathematical Appendix: Optimality Conditions
Married households optimize by choosing fcg; n; cs; hm; hf ; nm; nfg and singles by choosing
fcg; n; cs; hg; ngg each period assuming the time constraints always bind. The first order
conditions used to derive the analytical results in section 4, derived from maximizing equation
(1) subject to the budget constraints (2) with multiplier , are provided below.
The first order condition with respect to home hours for married individuals of gender i,
ni, is,
C1   1pk (1  ag)F (c^s; c^n) (1  as)c^ 1n  (O.1)
An(an

n + (1  an)n)
1 
 (1  an)n nnn 1i
=  p`
1 ` `` 1i :
and for market hours, hi, it is,
0;pk(1  1;pk)y 1;pkwei =  p`1 ` `` 1i : (O.2)
Combining Equations (O.1) and (O.4) for both spouses results in Equations (13) and
(14) of relative time allocations (home hours and leisure) for a married couple. For a single
individual the corresponding first order conditions are,
C1   1sk (1  ag)F (c^s; c^n) (1  as)c^ 1n  (O.3)
An(an

n + (1  an)ni )
1 
 (1  an)n 1i =  s;
and
0;sk(1  1;sk)y 1;skwei =  s: (O.4)
The optimality condition for home capital n is,
C1   1pk (1  ag)F (c^s; c^n) (1  as)c^ 1n  (O.5)
An(an

n + (1  an)n)
1 
 an
 1
n = pg:
From Equation (O.4) we can solve for the multiplier  and combining Equations (O.1), (O.5)
and (13) results in Equation (15), which describes the relative capital to home-time allocation.
The first order condition for market-service consumption cs is,
C1   1pk (1  ag)F (c^s; c^n) asc^ 1s = ps; (O.6)
1
and the equation for goods consumption cg is,
C1   1pk agc
 1
g = pg: (O.7)
Equations (O.5) and (O.6) combine to Equation (17), the relative consumption of market-
purchased to home-produced services, and Equations (O.6) and (O.7) combine to Equation
(18), the relative market-purchased services to goods consumption.
O.2 Results Appendix: Understanding the Mechanism
This appendix provides additional detail concerning the underlying mechanisms and assump-
tions in the model.
O.2.1 Alternative Simulations
The benchmark model is unable to match the large rise in female labor force participation
(the extensive margin), the rise in the share of women in services and some of the convergence
across islands. There are potentially two explanations for this failure: (1) women that work
one hour per week in the labor market are counted towards the labor force, however, hours
may not be as flexible in reality; and (2) search costs for service employment remain fixed, even
though the service sector grows in aggregate more than the share of men working in services.
To illustrate this further, I run two simulations, with the same benchmark calibration. First,
hours are assumed to be in the interval [0:12; 1]. That is, in order to work and earn a wage,
individuals have to work a day and a half per week. Second, keeping hours fully flexible (the
benchmark), I model a decrease in the cost of finding a service sector job on both islands in
2009; the cost reduction is one-third of a standard deviation. Table O.1 reports the resulting
change from 1977 to 2009 (including the original benchmark).
Both simulations generate a substantially larger response on the extensive margin, a fall of
16.4 percent in non-participation of married women compared to 22.3 percent in the data and
6.9 percent in the benchmark. However, while the “Hours” simulation is able to generate larger
convergence across islands (last two rows), the “Cost” simulation is able to generate a rise
in the share of women in services identical to the US. However, both generate a similar (and
small) fall in relative industry-to-service hours. Consequently, counterfactuals with these two
specifications produce similar results as the benchmark counterfactuals and are omitted here.
Moreover, as hours worked are noisy in the data and a fall in the cost of finding a service sector
job is diﬃcult to measure the benchmark calibration provides a good conservative simulation.
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Table O.1: Time Trends (Alternative Simulations)
Data Benchmark Hours Cost
Male Hours -1.6 -6.2 -6.5 -7.1
Female Hours 9.7 6.9 7.1 9.6
Single Male Hours -0.4 -2.7 -2.7 -3.2
Married Male Hours -1.1 -4.7 -5.0 -5.7
Single Female Hours 4.0 1.3 1.4 3.1
Married Female Hours 10.2 8.0 8.3 11.0
Industry-to-Service Hours -36.8 -28.7 -29.3 -29.7
Women Share in Services (%) 11.8 2.4 1.9 11.8
NILF Married Women (%) -22.3 -6.9 -16.4 -16.4
LFP Married Women Island A (%) 16.0 6.4 15.8 16.3
LFP Married Women Island B (%) 18.1 5.7 15.4 14.6
O.2.2 Decomposition of Trends
What accounts for the time trends in the model? The following analysis decomposes married
female hours and relative industry-to-service hours. The fall in male hours is mostly explained
by changing family composition - the share of single men increases and these men work
substantially less than married men. Figure O:1 shows how hours are aﬀected by individual
components of the model. In the figure we set all parameters at their 1977 levels and then allow
only one parameter (or a set combination) to change to their 2009 value. For example, the
columns labeled “tax” only changes the tax schedule (0; 1) to the 2009 values, the remaining
parameters (e.g., wage growth, structural transformation) remain fixed at the 1977 level.
Each set of columns (with corresponding label) graphs the eﬀects for the following exper-
iments,
1. Tax: only tax changes to the 2009 level
2. Education: returns to education changes to the 2009 level
3. Gender: the gender wage gap changes to the 2009 level
4. Marriage: the share married falls to 2009 values.
5. Children: the share with zero versus two children changes to 2009 values.
6. Family: marriage, parent and education shares are changed
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Figure O.1: Trend Decomposition
7. Structural Change: only productivity levels change, i.e., only are accounting for fs; g; ng
8. Main: combines the Education, Gender, Family and Structural Change experiments
Columns (1) show that changing tax schedules in the US had only a small impact on
changing married women’s hours and the size of the service sector. This does not mean that
tax schedules can be ignored when studying employment trends, but rather on it’s own small
tax changes have a small impact. Columns (2) show that a change in education returns
without a corresponding supply response has a negative eﬀects on hours worked and the
service sector. As the population is assumed to remain at its 1977 distribution, there is no
labor force that can take advantage of the rise in the college premium. More importantly,
women still face a large gender wage gap and, therefore, continue working at home. Columns
(3) account for changes in gender discrimination. A general increase in women’s productivity
has a large impact on married women’s hours (similar to Jones, Manuelli and McGrattan,
2003), but a smaller impact on the size of the service sector. Productivity alone can explain
73 percent of the increase in hours generated by the base model over time, but only 13 percent
of the fall in relative industry hours. Columns (4) show that the change in married couples
had a smaller impact on women’s hours than relative industry hours. In contrast, the change
4
in fertility over time has a marginal impact (Columns (5)). However, the population structure
undergoes four major changes over time, (1) the marriage rate falls, (2) assortative matching
in the marriage market increases, (3) fertility decreases for more educated individuals, and
(4) educational attainment increases. All four eﬀects are highly interlinked and, therefore,
Columns (6) combine all these four eﬀects in one counterfactual. Changing family structures
can account for one-third of the trend in married female hours, but just 16 percent of the fall
in industry-to-service hours. Columns (7) show that structural changes has a non-negligible
impact on married female hours, accounting for one-quarter of the change, and a large impact
on relative sectoral hours, accounting for 63 percent of the trend. The result for female
hours is similar to Akbulut (2011), who abstracts from women’s market productivity using a
simplified version of home production that produces a 25 percent rise in female market hours.
Lastly, Columns (8) combine productivity (both individual and sectoral) and family structure
to explain most of the rise in married female hours, and three-quarters of the fall in industry-
to-service hours. This large eﬀects from combining experiments (2) - (7) compared with the
results of Columns (8) suggests that some of the eﬀects are complimentary or cancel each other
out. In summary, the eﬀects on female hours and industry-to-service employment, especially
from Columns (3) - (8), suggest that female work and market services are interlinked.
O.2.3 The Eﬀect of Islands
How do locational constraints (island) and diﬀerences across sectors impact households’
(women’s) labor market choices? Removing one element at a time and studying the labor
allocation of women (single and married) can shed some light on the importance of modeling
island/sectoral diﬀerences without recalibrating the model to a diﬀerent equilibrium. The
eﬀects of five experiments are reported:
1. Productivity: the industry wage penalty is removed, g = 1:0
2. Island Preferences: mean disutility across islands is equalized, Bs = 
A
s
3. Service Preferences: the disutility of working in manufacturing is lowered to the disutility
of working in services within an island, Ig = 
I
s
and Ig = 
I
s
4. Preferences: disutilities are set to the distribution of service-employment in the service
island (the most favorable environment for women)
Figure O.2 shows how female hours in 2009 respond to each of the four counterfactuals.
Rather than recalibrating the model, the counterfactual is only computed for 2009 and com-
parisons are for 2009 benchmark values. Given the small gap in productivity (g), preferences
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Figure O.2: The Service Economy
are the main driver in generating diﬀerences across sectors and islands. Removing the ser-
vice island constraints would increase hours by 6 to 7 percent, while removing the sectoral
constraint within islands would increase hours by 7 to 9 percent. As expected, removing
all diﬀerences between sectors and islands has a large impact, with up-to 22 percent higher
married female hours in 2009.
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